OTTAWA — Espionage is a deadly serious and generally misunderstood business, and it’s critical for Canadian politicians thinking about starting a foreign spy service to decide “with their eyes wide open,” a new study says. “Virtually no Canadian knows how espionage is actually done,” says the paper by former Canadian intelligence officials Alan Barnes and Geoff St. John. “Romantic, facile notions predominate. Those bemused — or deceived — by the fictions of page and screen would benefit by learning how espionage is really done.” The study is being published this month on the website of the Policy Insights Forum, the research wing of the lobbying firm Samuel Associates. The federal government is preparing a long-awaited update of its national security strategy while the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians examines Canada’s foreign intelligence gathering capabilities. Barnes, who worked as an analyst and manager in the Canadian intelligence community for over 25 years, is a senior fellow at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. St. John, a retired member of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch, is director of the national security studies program at the Policy Insights Forum. Drawing on their own experience and the literature, the authors attempted to go beyond familiar arguments about setting up an espionage agency to look at what such spy services actually do, along with the full range of factors politicians need to consider. First and foremost, they write, policymakers must set aside the exploits of fictional spies like James Bond. “Ninety-nine per cent of all espionage fiction is pure junk,” the paper says. “Only a few fictional works have any merit. Those of John le Carré are the best examples, but professionals have even found fault with some of his characterizations of espionage. Ian Fleming’s Agent 007 exploits are pure fantasy. Bond films are not documentaries.” Espionage, the clandestine collection of information by people, involves hostile, undercover acts to learn things otherwise unknowable — actions that break the laws of the country where agents operate, the paper notes. The authors take pains to distinguish the intelligence officers who work for espionage agencies from the agents they recruit abroad to ferret out secrets. “Imagine you run an espionage agency tasked with finding out what senior generals say about invading a neighbouring country,” the paper suggests. “In the Hollywood version, one of your intelligence officers would infiltrate the meeting and report what was said. This is rank nonsense. The obstacles are insurmountable.” Even if an officer with the right background and language fluency could be assigned — and even if they could find a way into the meeting — they would be instantly recognized as a fraud, the authors write. “No, much, much better to have one of the generals tell you what was said. Far better to suborn one of them, or perhaps the note taker, or an official who gets the meeting notes, to learn what transpired.” Canada already has some eyes and ears on the world. The Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s cyberspy agency, collects foreign intelligence through electronic means. Global Affairs Canada contributes diplomatic reporting, while the military gathers defence-specific intelligence. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is permitted to gather intelligence in Canada and abroad about security threats such as terrorism and espionage. It is allowed to gather foreign intelligence — information about the activities, capabilities and intentions of foreign people, organizations and states — only within Canada, not overseas. Since the end of the Second World War, Canada has regularly considered creating its own version of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency or Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, better known as MI-6. The fundamental question is what purpose a Canadian espionage agency would serve, the paper says. Often the question takes a back seat to enthusiasm for simply having a spy agency, the authors lament. “Instead, the discussion should start by identifying the fundamental requirement — ‘Canada has a vital need for information on X which can only be obtained through espionage’ — before proceeding to consideration of the practical issues of actually establishing a new agency for this purpose,” the paper says. No espionage agency that Canada can afford could ever produce enough reports to replace the flood of raw information Canada receives from allies, the paper adds. “A Canadian espionage agency might be able to generate several hundred reports a year. And then it could only report on selected, narrow areas of Canadian interest, not all our interests.” The exposure of Canadian espionage operations would have diplomatic, political and economic repercussions, the authors warn. The foreign affairs minister and Canadian diplomats would have to deal with the fallout and try to limit the effect on Canada’s interests, the paper says. “In some cases the diplomatic response might be limited to the expulsion of diplomats. But the repercussions could be more severe if the foreign country targeted by Canada’s spies was otherwise considered a friend.” And the agents — the foreigners spying for Canada — would face very real physical, legal and psychological risks, the authors point out. “At best, if caught passing on secret material to a Canadian intelligence officer, he or she can expect a long prison sentence. At worst, the agent may be tortured and executed. It is a certainty that one or more agents spying for Canada will be found out eventually,” the paper says. “Canadian espionage officers would face risks as well. Those operating under embassy cover will have some protections but could still face physical abuse before the diplomatic protocols are enforced.” Espionage officers operating under some non-official cover, such as a business, would face greater dangers, the paper adds. Foreign governments might also use the existence of a Canadian espionage agency as a pretext for arresting Canadian citizens and claiming they were spies, it says. The authors say getting espionage right is very difficult. “It can succeed only with lots of political grit, the right strategic targets, willingness and ability to act on intelligence, tough tactics and very carefully selected, extremely well-trained espionage officers,” they write. “And even then, espionage may not uncover an enemy’s darkest secrets. There is simply no guarantee. But if it does work well, the value of its information may exceed considerably its costs and risks.” The “opportunity cost” of a Canadian espionage agency needs to be carefully considered, Barnes told The Canadian Press. “Investments in Canada’s neglected intelligence analysis capacity would likely have a bigger payoff in bolstering Canada’s ability to form an independent view of international developments than collecting more secret information at considerable risk and expense,” he said. Ottawa should create a foreign espionage agency only if it intends it to be highly effective, St. John said. “An ineffective agency would be an embarrassment to Canada and an expensive white elephant.” This report by The Canadian Press was first published Oct. 4, 2026. Jim Bronskill, The Canadian Press
