A train derailment outside Union Station earlier this year that led to widespread delays and cancellations across the GO network for days highlighted the need for “strengthening infrastructure inspection” along rail corridors, a new in-depth report into the incident notes. The nearly 60-page report was released by Metrolinx this month, about seven months after a GO train derailed on the Kitchener Line while leaving Union Station on the morning of Feb. 2. None of the passengers on board the train were injured, but the derailment led to overcrowding at Union Station along with major service disruptions across the network for days. A preliminary report found that the derailment was caused by rail fastenings that failed on a part of the track after screws “sheared” and ultimately “gave way” under the pressure. Metrolinx CEO Michael Lindsay previously said the required number of lag screws were not used to fasten the plates, with two screws used rather than four. Standards had been updated, he noted, and that section of the railway was not in compliance with the new rules. “It was identified that the fastening arrangement at the occurrence location had existed within the infrastructure for an extended period prior to the release of the 2025 standards update,” the new review read. “Based on inspection records, maintenance information, post-occurrence observations, and technical information reviewed, there was no evidence identified that the condition was knowingly accepted as compliant.” According to the report, the fastening condition “progressively developed over time through a combination of infrastructure degradation, historical maintenance practices, and reduced fastening effectiveness under repeated loading conditions.” “Earlier inspection and maintenance practices completed by TTR (Toronto Terminals Railway) may not have consistently assessed fastening configurations against the more explicit fastening expectations later introduced within the updated standards,” the review read. The report added that visual inspections were regularly done to assess track conditions, but geometry testing inspections, a more exhaustive type of track testing, was only conducted once a year. “Visual inspections helped identify surface level conditions such as missing fasteners, damaged ties, displaced plates, or visible track defects. However, visual inspections are limited to conditions that are visible at the time of inspection,” the report noted. “Snow accumulation, ice, ballast coverage, or other environmental conditions may reduce visibility of track components and fastening systems. Visual inspections could not reliably determine the remaining holding strength or clamping effectiveness of lag screws.” Inspection sheets used by inspectors consisted of “open comments fields,” the report read, and lacked “standardized prompts tied to track standard requirements.” “The combination of visually based inspections, limited inspection prompts, annual geometry testing intervals, and discretionary use of enhanced testing methods reduced the likelihood of identifying track infrastructure irregularities and progressive fastening degradation before the condition escalated into a derailment risk,” the report read. According to the deep dive report, an inspection blitz conducted after the incident revealed that 40 other locations along the rail corridor had rail fastenings that did not meet the required standards. “The conditions identified included missing or insufficient fasteners, rolled plates, mixed fastening configurations, and locations requiring additional spikes or lag screws to properly secure the rail,” the report read. “In addition to fastening deficiencies, inspectors identified other track conditions, including ice jacking, packed snow and ice around frogs, ice accumulation within the track structure, and another wide gauge condition.” Corrective actions were taken to address the issues, the report noted. ‘Unsanctioned communications channels’ The review also examined how the derailment was communicated and managed from an operations standpoint. According to the report, “multiple unsanctioned communications channels and chat threads” were used during the disruption, which reduced “consistency of messaging” and created “challenges related to authoritative information sharing.” The report noted that frontline staff and customers “did not always receive timely or realistic information regarding expected service impacts during the disruption.” Shortly after the derailment, Lindsay confirmed that inspections had been carried out and the railway corridor is safe. He added that Metrolinx will continue to review its own protocols in relation to the incident to ensure proper inspections are conducted. He noted that one of the “key lessons” the agency has taken away from the derailment is the importance of “communication of information in a time of crisis.”
