A real estate executive has been found guilty of civil contempt by B.C.’s highest court after transferring more than $44 million to his brother via a pair of sticky notes. Evangelos “Van” Kolias executed the handwritten “gift” documents in violation of a consent restraining order he had agreed to in a family law case, the B.C. Court of Appeal ruled in a decision issued earlier this week. The ruling reversed the decision of a case management judge, who had determined that Kolias’s transfer of the funds did not violate the order. “Although the particulars of Mr. Kolias’s financial interests and property holdings are exceedingly convoluted, the basic facts of this case are not,” reads the appeal court decision, written by Justice W. Paul Riley on behalf of the three-judge panel that heard the case. According to the decision, Kolias started a business with his brother Sam in 1984 that has since grown into a real estate venture worth “well over $100 million.” Riley refers to the business as “the Boardwalk enterprise” and says it consists of the publicly traded Boardwalk REIT and “a collection of closely held companies controlled by the two brothers.” Two of those companies are Boardwalk Properties Company Limited (BPCL) and Park Place Holdings Limited (PPHL), according to the decision. The sticky note transfers gifted Sam $13 million “to be credited out of (Kolias’s) shareholder loan” to BPCL and $31.4 million to be credited the same way out of his shareholder loan to PPHL. The transaction occurred in February 2024, almost a year after Kolias and Clair Anita Barnes-Morrison ended their 12-year relationship in April 2023, according to the appeal court decision. Barnes-Morrison initiated the family law case in May 2023, seeking spousal support and division of family property. BCPL and PPHL were included on the list of properties in which Barnes-Morrison claimed an interest. Riley’s decision indicates the parties consented to the restraining order in July 2023, and it prohibited both Barnes-Morrison and Kolias from “disposing of, encumbering, assigning, or in any similar manner dealing with any property at issue in this proceeding, without written consent of the parties or further (court) order.” The lower court decision Riley’s decision outlines the circumstances and arguments made before the lower court after Barnes-Morrison applied to hold Kolias in contempt over the sticky note transaction in July 2025. She asked the case-management judge in the matter to find Kolias in contempt, to fine him $450,000 for that contempt, and to order him to demand the return of the transferred funds from his brother in order to purge his contempt. Kolias opposed Barnes-Morrison’s application, arguing that “he ‘did not beneficially own the interests’ in issue and accordingly it could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the impugned transactions constituted a ‘wilful and deliberate’ breach of the consent restraining order,” according to the appeal court decision. Kolias told the lower court the sticky note transfers were “part of a larger, unwritten agreement made with his brother in 2009.” The purpose of this agreement, Riley’s decision explains, was “to limit Mr. Kolias’s market exposure by effectively capping the value of his interest in the Boardwalk enterprise at $20 million.” “On the basis of the foregoing explanation, Mr. Kolias’s position at the contempt hearing was that he ‘does not beneficially own the interests registered in his name’ in the Boardwalk enterprise,” the appeal court decision reads. The case-management judge largely accepted this argument, finding that the wording of the consent restraining order could be interpreted as excluding property Kolias does not beneficially own, and that Kolias was entitled to the “most favourable” interpretation of the order. The lower court judge also rejected Barnes-Morrison’s application on the basis that it fell short of the “exacting standard required” by failing to specify which term on the consent restraining order the transaction had violated, and by lacking sufficient clarity as to how Kolias was supposed to purge his alleged contempt. The appeal decision On appeal, Riley found both of the case-management judge’s reasons for dismissing the contempt application to be lacking. He ruled that the lower court judge had misapprehended the degree of precision needed in contempt filings, finding that Barnes-Morrison’s contempt application had named a specific term of the order that had been violated, provided the application was read “as a whole.” Likewise, the alleged lack of clarity on how Kolias should purge his contempt was “not fatal” to the application, according to Riley. “As a ‘general rule’ contempt proceedings are bifurcated into a liability and a penalty phase because they are discrete issues,” the appeal decision reads. “In this case, the relief sought in the contempt notice was clear enough to inform Mr. Kolias of the jeopardy he faced and sufficient for the court to proceed with a hearing to determine whether he was guilty as alleged. Any inquiry into the just and appropriate penalty, including a consideration of the efficacy or propriety of a purging order, ought to have been deferred to the penalty phase of the proceedings.” On the question of whether the consent restraining order explicitly prohibited the sticky note transfer, Riley concluded that it did. He ruled that the lower court judge’s interpretation of the order as excluding property Kolias does not beneficially own “was inconsistent with the very nature and purpose” of the order. “The judge’s interpretive errors led her to conclude that the text of the consent restraining order was ambiguous, when on a proper interpretation, the terms of the order were clear,” Riley’s decision reads. “A ‘true ambiguity’ arises ‘only if, after the usual rules of interpretation have been applied,’ the words in question have two meanings, equally consistent with the objective intent of the instrument in question.” Riley also rejected Kolias’s overarching argument about beneficial ownership. Essentially, Kolias argued that he didn’t actually own the money he gave to his brother, and that his beneficial ownership of it was a “contested issue” in the underlying family law case. Therefore, he argued, he couldn’t have been in contempt of the order by transferring it. “I cannot accede to this argument,” Riley’s decision reads. “It would turn (section 91 of the Family Law Act) on its head by allowing a spouse to disregard a restraining order by merely asserting a lack of true or beneficial ownership of the property in issue. The whole point of the restraining order is to preserve property in which a party may have an interest until the merits of each party’s position in respect of the claimed property can be fully litigated.” Having ruled that the case-management judge erred in finding that Kolias was not guilty of civil contempt, Riley substituted a guilty finding, and referred the matter back to the lower court for a hearing on what penalties Kolias should face.