KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - The war Brig. Gen. Jonathan Vance found himself fighting was a small one.
Under his command, Canadian troops in Afghanistan reduced their area of operation by more than half. With his over-stretched forces relieved this summer by a surge in American forces, Vance focused on six villages with a combined population of no more than 5,000 people.
But in those villages, Vance claims to have given momentum to a mission that was fast losing ground to insurgents in the field and critics at home.
"I would say we are at a turning point in the mission," Vance told The Canadian Press in the final days of his 10-month tour.
"We are far more aligned and able to resource the challengea I think in terms of direct support to the Afghan population, it's just gotten better and better as our force-ration has improved."
With Canadian troops now concentrated in Kandahar city and the districts of Dand and Panjwaii, Vance ended the practice of chasing insurgents from village to village before returning to heavily-fortified outposts.
Known by some soldiers as "mowing the grass," It proved ineffective at addressing the root causes of the insurgency.
Vance's idea was to leave soldiers in a series of small villages, allowing them to provide security and short-term development projects. Locals were paid for basic tasks, depriving the Taliban of foot soldiers. The hope was to attract nearby villages as well, expanding an "inkblot" of stability friendly to Canadians.
The experiment, referred to as "Vance's baby" by some of his soldiers, has met with some success in at least two of the villages, Deh-e-Bagh and Balanday, both in Dand, southwest of Kandahar city. Villagers there have begun tipping Canadian soldiers off to IED placements and pointing out suspected Taliban members. Some 1,000 locals have been provided jobs.
In many ways, Vance's strategy -- which won praise from NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and caught the eye of U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal -- is a return to the basic counter-insurgency principles developed from the British experience in Malaya and the French in Algeria.
But it was also fashioned with an awareness of the unique challenges presented by operating in Afghanistan's Pashtun belt.
While preparing for the mission, Vance sought out Dr. Thomas Johnson, a professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who has spent more than 20 years studying the intricacies of Afghan politics, culture and anthropology.
Johnson's time in Afghanistan had made him weary of previous U.S. and NATO approaches to defeating the Taliban, which failed to recognize the importance of village-level politics.
"You have to operate at the same level as the Taliban and they operate 24/7 at the village level," Johnson said in a recent interview.
"Everything that is important in Afghan history, at least in terms of the Pashtuns, has occurred at the village level. Rural Pashtuns have never had a great affinity for Kabul."
Johnson, who also spent a month in the summer embedded with Vance, credited the general for grasping the importance of village politics. More than that, Vance seemed to relish it at times.
He raised eyebrows earlier this year when he demanded a shura with the village elders of Deh-e-Bagh after a vehicle in his convoy hit an IED -- something, he sternly pointed out, that wasn't supposed to happen under the terms of the coalition's arrangement with the village.
There have been other reports of Vance hectoring children for throwing rocks at Canadian soldiers. Some have questioned whether his brash style was the best way to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.
Vance has defended himself from what he called a "warped perception in the media," but Johnson had a different explanation.
"He recognized the importance of poetic statement and dramatic action," Johnson said. "This is extremely important for dealing with rural Pashtuns."
Vance said he believes that by forging relationships with village elders and offering material gains to villagers, he has been able to co-opt support for an insurgency that is inherently limited in its appeal.
"The Taliban are not very good insurgents," he said. "The Taliban have no plans, no platform, no political charisma, no idea about what they would do as a result of using violence."
Of course, that does little to explain the insurgency's stubbornness.
The Taliban have established an extensive network of shadow governance, where the courts are more popular than the government's in many rural areas of Kandahar. U.S. intelligence estimates suggest the Taliban, and its affiliated guerilla networks, control about 70 per cent of the country.
Last month was the bloodiest for American troops in the country since 2001; 25 Canadian soldiers died during Vance's tour.
The Taliban's persistence can be explained by two overlapping factors, said Vance. One, a hard-core element from Pakistan that crosses into Afghanistan at will, emboldening those who oppose the government; two, a shortage of benevolent governance in Afghanistan.
Indeed, if the model village approach has a vulnerability, it is that it depends on encouraging locals to trust a national government that is itself inherently difficult to trust.
"Clearly, the government has also demonstrated on occasion that they need to raise their game," Vance said. "The Taliban takes advantage of that through violent means."
Indeed, Vance points out that Afghan politics has enduring traits that challenge the viability of government at any level: warlordism, tribalism and corruption, for a start.
But, he also notes, the time has come for Afghans themselves to make up their mind about whom to support, the coalition forces or the insurgents. They can't have it both ways any longer.
"A population that doesn't commit allows for both sides to operate in its midst as its deciding," Vance said. "So if you're facilitating Taliban movement or activity simply by acquiescence, you're part of the problem."
Vance is nevertheless optimistic that the small war being conducted by Canadians in a dusty patch of Kandahar will help restore some element of stability to the country.
"I don't know if its a family vacation kind of place," he said, "but I can tell you that I am convinced Afghanistan will recover to the extent that it needs to take care of itself."
