When an unauthorized drone was spotted over one of Canada’s busiest air force bases, a new counter-drone system completely failed to detect it, according to a report obtained through an access to information request. With the drone operator remaining unidentified, experts say the September 2025 incident from CFB Trenton highlights a potential defence gap that could be exploited to attack or gather intelligence on the Canadian military. “There’s no doubt that our adversaries have capabilities to cause us significant harm and we do not have the capabilities to deal with that,” retired Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) lieutenant-general Christopher Coates told CTVNews.ca from Ottawa. RCAF reports obtained by CTVNews.ca through an access to information request detail seven similar cases from 2024 and 2025 at both CFB Trenton in Ontario and CFB Cold Lake in Alberta. Arguably two of the most important air bases in Canada, Trenton houses essential transport aircraft like the CC-177 Globemaster III while Cold Lake is home to a significant part of Canada’s CF-18 fighter jet fleet. In all seven cases, the reports show that there were no attempts to intercept the drones and their operators were never identified. Coates previously served as the deputy commander and highest ranking Canadian at Norad, the joint Canada-U.S. continental defence group. He is now the director of foreign policy, national defence and national security at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, a public policy think tank. “To really affect Canada and our military, you don’t need to attack a base or the aircraft or the ships, you can attack dependent infrastructure,” Coates explained. “So electrical distribution and transmission networks, the transportation system, resupply systems – they’re all soft, none of them are protected.” Some of the incidents identified by CTVNews.ca also roughly coincide with a wave of drone incursions across Europe, which have caused major disruptions at military facilities as well as airports and critical infrastructure sites like nuclear power plants. While Coates is not aware of any evidence linking the Canadian cases to potentially hostile actors like Russia, he and others say Canada needs to be better prepared to deal with the potential threat even if adversaries are not currently showing intent. “Drones are the ideal tools for sabotage operations because they can allow perpetrators to operate remotely and make attribution significantly more difficult,” Toronto-based Ukrainian defence analyst Olena Kryzhanivska told CTVNews.ca. “I believe that the risk of hostile actors using drones to cause damage or gather intelligence in Canada is significant.” Kryzhanivska is the author of Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, where she writes extensively about drone warfare and technology, which is evolving rapidly and redefining the battlefield in Russia’s war against Ukraine. “These threats are not limited to military facilities,” Kryzhanivska added. “They could affect Canada’s broader security and defence infrastructure, as well as civilian sectors.” The Cold Lake and Trenton cases The four reports from CFB Cold Lake all detail military personnel spotting unauthorized drones in restricted airspace, including one that travelled at an estimated speed of 60 to 100 km/h that “was observed to be boxy in shape, approximately 60cm in width, emitting what appeared to be a yellowish light with no sound from it heard.” Another – described as a small white drone carrying a “black tube” – apparently made two appearances at CFB Cold Lake within four days in September 2025. Those were the most recent Cold Lake reports uncovered by CTVNews.ca, and they plainly state that the base “does not currently have a means of tracking small UAS aircraft.” UAS is short for unmanned (or uncrewed) aircraft system. At CFB Trenton, the first of the three reports reviewed by CTVNews.ca mention that the base was about to become one of the first military airfields in Canada to be equipped with counter-drone technology. “The system will be a detection only system until the magnitude of the risk is realized,” the September 2024 report explains. “Numerous legal hurtles [sic] exist preventing the use of a counter-UAS system that could be used to destroy, neutralize or take control of a UAS.” The reports say that system became operational in March 2025. But when a camera-equipped drone buzzed the base’s runway on Sept. 17, 2025, the system was offline due to a planned power outage. The power, however, was on just days later during another drone sighting on Sept. 22, 2025, but according to a report, the “counter UAS system did not detect the drone.” On the same day across the Atlantic, unidentified drones led to serious disruptions at a military base in France and airports in Denmark and Norway, according to a drone incident tracker. The Trenton reports note that signs around the base warn the public that “that operating drones in the vicinity of the airfield is prohibited.” They also mention that no civilian drone flights were authorized at the time of these incidents. In a statement to CTVNews.ca, Canada’s Department of National Defence declined to comment on any of the cases mentioned in this article or any of its counter-drone measures. “We can’t comment further for operational and security reasons,” a National Defence spokesperson said via email. “DND/CAF does not comment on current or planned security measures, operational capabilities, threat assessments, vulnerabilities, incidents, specific locations, or deployment plans.” ‘There is no silver-bullet solution’ Experts say creating and deploying an effective counter-drone system is easier said than done “It’s not that somebody hasn’t done their job and gone out and bought what’s required,” former RCMP officer and counter-drone specialist Brian Fentiman told CTVNews.ca. “It’s this is a very complex problem and that there is no easy solution.” Fentiman is the president and CEO of BlueForce UAV Consulting Inc., a Comox, B.C.-based company that specializes in drone and counter-drone training and consulting for clients like Canadian airports and law enforcement agencies. “Let’s face it, no military in the world really thought drones were a big threat until the last couple of years and now everybody’s scrambling,” Fentiman said. “It really needs to be a multi-faceted approach because what you’re going to do domestically for installations in Canada is not going to be the same thing that you’re going to do in either the theatre of war or in a conflict zone, where you have more kinetic options.” To be effective, counter-drone systems need to be able to detect, track, identify and engage potential threats. Detection, tracking and identification systems can include radar, radio frequency, optical and acoustic sensors, as well as AI tools. Taking out or disabling a drone can utilize electronic warfare systems like radio frequency or GPS jammers, or kinetic methods such as nets, interceptor drones, projectiles like bullets or missiles, or even directed-energy weapons that use lasers or high-powered microwaves. Simply put, it’s not as simple as aiming and pulling the trigger on a counter-drone jammer gun. “If you just jam the control link, most drones are programmed so that they’ll just come back to where they took off from,” Fentiman explained. “People that have nefarious intent can also program their drone so that it flies to a target area if its control signal gets interrupted.” In Ukraine, where drone warfare is rapidly evolving, Kryzhanivska notes that drones are now utilizing fibre-optic cables and autonomous capabilities that can allow them to operate despite attempts at electronic interference. “Broadly speaking, it is a constant cat-and-mouse game,” Kryzhanivska said. “The main lesson is that there is no silver-bullet solution capable of countering every type of drone threat.” While the Canadian military is authorized to use an array of tools to engage drones in operational settings like Canada’s mission in Latvia, doing so on Canadian soil is an entirely different matter. As one of the reports from CFB Trenton notes, there remain significant domestic legal and regulatory hurdles when it comes to downing a drone in domestic contexts, especially with kinetic options like live ammunition or interceptor drones. But recent exemptions to the Radiocommunication Act now allow jammers to be used by the military as well as certain correctional services and law enforcement agencies in specific instances such as national security and protecting people and property from serious harm. In addition to deploying a range of new technologies and making regulatory changes, Fentiman says creating effective counter-drone measures also requires new procedures and protocols that are aimed at minimizing collateral damage and defining acceptable risks when intercepting drones near civilian areas. “If you do hit it, if all you do is damage it slightly, you’re sending it into a residential area,” Fentiman said. “So a lot of work has to be going into what is acceptable risk. … It’s a very complex problem to make that assessment.” ‘Improvements are still needed’ The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are actively looking to fill these gaps. This year, the department has issued counter-drone procurement notices and launched the Defence Drone Initiative, which in part will “explore affordable systems that could detect, track or defeat hostile drones” in order to “contribute to the protection of military personnel, installations and infrastructure.” Released on Nov. 7, the federal government’s latest budget proposes $2.3 billion over five years for advancing the Canadian military’s drone and counter-drone capabilities. “C-UAS capabilities are a critical consideration in modern security and defence planning,” a National Defence spokesperson told CTVNews.ca. “DND has procurement activities planned to support the continued evolution and enhancement of its approach to countering UAS threats, building on existing measures and capabilities.” While such systems are already being deployed in Latvia and at Canadian naval ports and air bases, the reports obtained by CTVNews.ca highlight that more work needs to be done. “Essentially the Defence team is ‘working on it’ but continuous improvements are still needed and quickly,” Alexander Salt, an assistant professor at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, told CTVNews.ca. Salt, whose research includes drone warfare, says potential adversaries could use commercially available and legally acquired drones to conduct surveillance and even sabotage at bases and critical infrastructure sites in Canada. Salt says “the threat is very real, and very urgent and requires immediate action.” “There is no one technological solution, so Canada will have to invest and procure broadly to cover its bets in this area,” Salt added. “Essentially, the Canadian military, like many of its allies needs to work quickly to ‘harden’ its bases and infrastructure against potential future threats in this area.”