Laser hair removal technician must register as sex offender, B.C. court rules

A person is shown performing laser hair removal in this stock photo. (Image credit: Shutterstock)

A B.C. man convicted of committing sex crimes against female clients while working as a laser hair removal technician has lost his bid for an exemption from the requirement to register as a sex offender.

Ali Aghasardar pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault and one count of voyeurism last year and was handed a one-year conditional sentence order followed by one year of probation. He was also required – despite the objections of his counsel – to register as a sex offender for 10 years, according to a decision posted online Tuesday dismissing the appeal of the registration requirement.

The offences occurred in 2019 when Aghasardar was working at a clinic in downtown Vancouver. He was 50 at the time and his victims were women in their early 20s, according to the decision.

“The sexual assault was extremely serious, involving unwanted digital penetration of the victim’s vagina,” Justice Michael Tammen wrote in his decision, summarizing – in part – what Aghasardar did to one of his clients.

“With respect to the sexual assault, (Aghasardar) apparently believed that the victim was sexually interested in him, and that in part motivated his behaviour toward her,” the judge continued.

The voyeurism charge involved three separate victims.

“During the course of performing laser hair removal treatment on each of those individuals, the appellant took photographs of their naked genital areas without their knowledge or consent, using his personal cellular telephone,” the judge wrote.

“With respect to the voyeurism offences, the appellant rationalized that somehow the inappropriate photographs were part of his work, despite the fact that he clearly broke work protocols in taking them,” Tammen continued.

Grounds for exemption

An order under Canada’s Sex Offender Information Registration Act, according to the decision, is mandatory unless one can establish an exception should be made.

“The offender bears the onus of establishing that they are entitled to exemption from the imposition of a SOIRA order,” Tammen wrote.

The law lays out two possible grounds for exceptions and Aghasardar’s appeal of the registration requirement argued both were at play.

First, someone must prove there is “no connection” between imposing the order and its purpose – which is to keep a record of convicted offenders in order to help police prevent or investigate sex crimes. Central to this is the risk of reoffending.

Arguing for an exception on this basis, Aghasardar’s lawyer told the court that the sentencing judge did not properly assess risk and instead engaged in “impermissible speculation” on the matter.

The sentencing judge acknowledged Aghasardar’s risk was assessed as “below average when compared to other sex offenders” and that Aghasardar said he was no longer working as a laser hair removal technician. However, the judge also found there would be nothing in place post-probation that would prevent Aghasardar from working in the field again where “he could come across vulnerable women.”

Tammen rejected the argument that raising the possibility of Aghasardar returning to a job where he would have access to vulnerable women was speculation, finding that the sentencing judge was “was merely noting the obvious.”

He found the sentencing judge had not made an error in this regard.

Second, an exemption can be granted on the grounds of “gross disproportionality” – meaning that the impact on a person’s privacy and freedom outweighs the purpose of the order, which is to protect the public.

Aghasardar’s lawyer argued the sentencing judge did not properly consider the impact of the order. Specifically, that by the time it expires his client will have been “subject to 16 years of heightened state supervision.”

By the time Aghasardar was sentenced, he had been bound by conditions for nearly four years. That, his lawyer argued, combined with the sentence and probation would be proportionate in this case.

However, Tammen found the pre-sentencing conditions were not “particularly onerous” and rejected the claim they amounted to “intrusive state supervision.”

While the conditions prohibited Aghasardar from having contact with his victims and restricted his ability to be alone with clients, he was not required to report to a bail supervisor or otherwise subjected to monitoring.

Aghasardar’s appeal was dismissed accordingly.